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Abstract
Model uncertainty has the potential to change importantly how monetary policy should
be conducted, making it an issue that central banks cannot ignore. In this paper, I use
a standard new Keynesian business cycle model to analyze the behavior of a central bank
that conducts policy with discretion while fearing that its model is misspeci￿ed. My main
results are as follows. First, policy performance can be improved if the discretionary
central bank implements a robust policy. This important result is obtained because the
central bank￿ s desire for robustness directs it to assertively stabilize in￿ ation, thereby mit-
igating the stabilization bias associated with discretionary policymaking. In e⁄ect, a fear
of model uncertainty can act similarly to a commitment mechanism. Second, exploiting
the connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion, I show that the central
bank￿ s fear of model misspeci￿cation leads it to forecast future outcomes under the be-
lief that in￿ ation (in particular) will be persistent and have large unconditional variance,
raising the probability of extreme outcomes. Private agents, however, anticipating the
policy response, make decisions under the belief that in￿ ation will be more closely sta-
bilized, that is, more tightly distributed, than under rational expectations. Third, as a
technical contribution, I show how to solve an important class of linear-quadratic robust
Markov-perfect Stackelberg problems.
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It is the nature of models to simplify reality. Unfortunately, this simpli￿cation goes hand-
in-hand with model misspeci￿cation and model uncertainty; it weakens the foundations sup-
porting model-based policy design and poses important challenges for central banks. To
what extent does achieving robustness to model uncertainty require a sacri￿ce in policy per-
formance? How does model uncertainty shape the beliefs that the central bank and private
agents hold about future economic outcomes? Does a central bank￿ s concern for model mis-
speci￿cation have a material e⁄ect on policy outcomes? These questions have important
implications for monetary policy, and although central banks have always had to grapple with
them, if not always explicitly, there is relatively little consensus about their answers.
I investigate these questions in the context of a new Keynesian business cycle model in
which households, ￿rms, and a central bank reside. The model is typical of those used to
analyze monetary policy (Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler, 1999) and is similar in spirit, if some-
what simpler, than Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
Households smooth consumption relative to a habit stock, saving or borrowing against future
income through the purchase or sale of one-period nominal bonds. Firms set prices to max-
imize pro￿ts, subject to a Calvo-style adjustment cost and in￿ ation indexation. The central
bank conducts policy with discretion, setting the return on the one-period nominal bond to
optimize a policy loss function de￿ned over macroeconomic aggregates, such as in￿ ation and
consumption.
To introduce model uncertainty, I follow Hansen and Sargent (2007) and assume that the
central bank is skeptical of its model, fearing that it may be distorted by speci￿cation errors.
Thus, the central bank in the economy I analyze designs policy while seeking robustness to
unstructured perturbations about its approximating, or reference, model.1 Importantly, in my
analysis the central bank formulates its robust policy while taking into account that the dis-
tortions it fears also a⁄ect how private agents form expectations, similar to Woodford (2005).
Although I employ robust control techniques, I take advantage of results in Hansen, Sargent,
and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) that relate
the multiple models in robust control to the multiple priors in uncertainty aversion (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989) to reinterpret the solution to the robust control problem. A connection
1At the same time, I recognize that there are other ways to analyze monetary policy with uncertainty. See,
for example, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Tetlow and von zur Muehlin (2001), Onatski and
Stock (2002), Giannoni (2002), Levin and Williams (2003), Onatski and Williams (2003), and Svensson and
Williams (2006).
1between robust control and uncertainty aversion arises because the worst-case speci￿cation er-
rors that emerge in the solution to the robust control problem manifest themselves in the form
of worst-case shock processes. These worst-case shock processes can be interpreted as a set of
worst-case beliefs, or a worst-case prior over future states, that is distorted relative to rational
expectations.
An important result that emerges from my analysis is that robustness need not entail a
decline in policy performance. To the contrary, a central bank that implements a robust pol-
icy may actually improve policy performance, and not just in extreme, low-probability states
of nature, but on average. Although this result may seem surprising on the surface, it has
a clear and intuitive explanation. When expectations are rational, time-inconsistency leads
to a welfare-lowering stabilization bias in which in￿ ation is understabilized and consumption
is overstabilized relative to the Ramsey (commitment) policy (Dennis and S￿derstr￿m, 2006).
To the extent that a fear of model uncertainty directs the discretionary central bank to sta-
bilize in￿ ation more tightly, the desire for robustness can mitigate the stabilization bias and
potentially raise welfare. Ordinarily, of course, a concern for reputation (Barro and Gordon,
1983), an optimal contract (Walsh, 1995), the appointment of an optimally conservative central
banker (Rogo⁄, 1985), or the strategic delegation of policy objectives by a benevolent authority
(Walsh, 2003) is required to improve on discretionary policymaking, but with robustness it is
a malevolent planner that strategically designs the model (not the policy objectives), and the
actions of the malevolent planner arise endogenously to re￿ ect not the central bank￿ s desire
to raise welfare, but rather its fear of model misspeci￿cation.
My analysis also demonstrates that a central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿cation can distort
importantly ￿ and asymmetrically ￿ its beliefs about likely future economic outcomes and
the beliefs that private agents hold. Thus, where the central bank￿ s worst-case beliefs empha-
size the possibility that in￿ ation may be persistent and have a large unconditional variance,
anticipating the policy response, private agents￿beliefs emphasize that in￿ ation will be more
closely stabilized, and more tightly distributed, than under rational expectations. In addi-
tion, because the central bank￿ s worst-case beliefs assign greater probability to the tails of the
in￿ ation and consumption distributions than rational expectations do, and because outcomes
in the tails of these distributions come at a disproportionately high cost, the robust policy re-
sponds more forcefully to shocks than the nonrobust policy and generates greater interest rate
volatility as a consequence. For this reason, the central bank￿ s fear of model misspeci￿cation
can have important e⁄ects on policy outcomes.
2Relatively few papers use robust control to analyze optimal monetary policy, and even
fewer focus on discretionary policymaking. Leitemo and S￿derstr￿m (2005) ask whether
a greater desire for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to shocks
and argue that the answer depends on the type of shock and the source of misspeci￿cation.
Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m (2006b) analyze robust monetary policy in an estimated
small open economy model. They show that distortions to uncovered interest parity are
both highly damaging and hard to detect. Giordani and S￿derlind (2004) show how linear-
quadratic techniques for obtaining time-consistent equilibria in rational expectations models
can be applied to robust control problems, techniques that I modify and extend in this paper.2
My analysis also relates to work by Dennis (2005) and Hansen and Sargent (2007, chapter
16); however, I analyze robust time-consistent policies, whereas they analyze robust Ramsey
(commitment) policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the new Key-
nesian business cycle model that I use to study the e⁄ects of robustness. Section 3 describes
my formulation of the robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problem and presents its solution.
Section 4 describes the connection between the robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problem
that I analyze and uncertainty aversion. Section 5 demonstrates how the central bank￿ s de-
sire for robustness distorts its expectation￿ s operator and thereby in￿ uences monetary policy.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
To illustrate how a fear of model misspeci￿cation can a⁄ect policy, I use a simple hybrid new
Keynesian business cycle model as a laboratory. The model contains equations explaining
in￿ ation, ￿t, and consumption, ct, as a function of the short-term nominal interest rate, it,
and two serially correlated shocks, st and dt, and can be written as
￿t = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿t+1 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿ct + st; (1)
ct = (1 ￿ ￿)Etct+1 + ￿ct￿1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + dt; (2)
st = ￿st￿1 + ￿""t; (3)
dt = ￿dt￿1 + ￿￿￿t: (4)
2Speci￿cally, unlike Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), I assume that the leader fears that private-agent expec-
tations are distorted by model misspeci￿cation and that private agents, while taking the leader￿ s robust policy
into account, use the approximating model to form expectations and make decisions.
3Equation (1) describes a hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve in which forward-dynamics






governs the importance of forward-looking expectations in price-setting,
equaling zero under Calvo-pricing (Calvo, 1983), ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the subjective discount
factor, and ￿ 2 (0;1), the coe¢ cient on consumption, is a function of the share of ￿rms that
set their price optimally each period. Equation (2) summarizes consumption behavior in an






regulates the importance of habits while ￿ 2 (0;1), the coe¢ cient on the ex ante
real interest rate, denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Supply and demand
shocks, st and dt, described by equations (3) and (4), respectively, each follow ￿rst-order





The short-term nominal interest rate, it, serves as the central bank￿ s policy instrument.
I assume that the central bank conducts policy with discretion, that it chooses fitg
1
t=0, and











where ￿ 2 [0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1).
The monetary policy transmission mechanism largely operates as follows. Through price
rigidity a rise in the nominal interest rate raises the ex ante real interest rate, which low-
ers current period demand as households seek to defer consumption. Responding to lower
demand, ￿rms that can change their price moderate their price increase, which damps in￿ a-
tion. Monetary policy also operates through in￿ ation expectations, with higher interest rates
lowering in￿ ation expectations and, hence, also current in￿ ation.
Although the model is stylized, its usefulness resides in the fact that it is simple enough to
be easily understood, yet rich enough to illustrate the importance robustness plays in shaping
policy and economic outcomes. For the simulations in Section 5, I calibrate the model on the
basis that the data are observed quarterly. Drawing on an array of studies, but on work by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Dennis (2006) in
particular, I set ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:12, ￿ = 0:4, and ￿ = 0:05. With respect to the
shock processes, I set ￿ = ￿ = 0:5, and ￿" = ￿￿ = 1:0. In the policy objective function, I set
￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:1. In Section 6, I consider alternative values for these parameters as part
of a sensitivity analysis.
43 Robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problems
In this section I present, in general terms, a linear-quadratic decision problem in which a
Stackelberg leader conducts policy with discretion while seeking robustness to model misspec-
i￿cation. After describing the robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problem, I show how to solve
for an equilibrium ￿ the approximating equilibrium￿ in which the leader employs a policy
designed strategically to guard against model misspeci￿cation, while the followers, who do not
fear model misspeci￿cation, make decisions and form expectations using the approximating
model, taking the leader￿ s desire for robustness into account.
3.1 The problem
The economy consists of a Stackelberg leader, such as a central bank, a ￿scal authority, or, more
generally, a government, and one or more followers, such as households, ￿rms, and other private
agents. Both the leader and the followers are assumed to share an approximating model3 that
they believe comes closest to describing the economy. According to this approximating model,
an n ￿ 1 vector of endogenous variables, zt, consisting of n1 predetermined variables, xt, and
n2 (n2 = n ￿ n1) non-predetermined variables, yt, evolves over time according to
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1"t+1; (6)
Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (7)
where ut is a p ￿ 1 vector of policy control variables, "t ￿ i:i:d:[0;Ins] is an ns ￿ 1 (ns ￿ n1)
vector of white-noise innovations, and Et is the private sector￿ s mathematical expectations
operator conditional upon period t information. The matrices A11, A12, A21, A22, B1, and
B2 are conformable with xt, yt, and ut, as necessary, and contain the structural parameters
that govern preferences and technology. The matrix C1 is determined to ensure that "t has
the identity matrix as its variance-covariance matrix.
If the approximating model is known to be correctly speci￿ed,4 then the leader￿ s problem





















3This terminology follows Hansen and Sargent (2007). Elsewhere, notably Onatski and Williams (2003),
Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m (2006a,b) and Tillmann (2007), the term
￿reference model￿is used.
4Standard references to the solution of this problem include Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and Dri¢ ll
(1986); see Dennis (2007) for an alternative method.








, subject to equations (1)
and (2), Markov-perfection, and a known x0, where the weighting matrices, W and R, are











) is assumed to be stabilizable (Kwakernaak and Sivan,
1972, chapter 6).5
However, although the approximating model describes most accurately the economy￿ s
structure, the leader is skeptical of the model, fearing that it may be misspeci￿ed. Moreover,
the leader fears that private agents use the distorted model to form expectations.6 To accom-
modate its fear, the leader introduces a vector of speci￿cation errors, vt+1, and surrounds the
approximating model with the class of distorted models
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1 (vt+1 + "t+1); (9)
Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (10)
where the sequence of speci￿cation errors, fvt+1g
1







t+1vt+1 ￿ ￿; ￿ 2 [0;￿): (11)
To guard against the speci￿cation errors that it fears, the leader formulates policy subject to
the distorted model and takes the position that the speci￿cation errors will be as damaging as
possible, a position operationalized through the metaphor that fvt+1g
1
0 is chosen by a ￿ctitious
evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to those of the leader. Accordingly, the
leader￿ s robust problem is to choose futg
1
0 to minimize equation (8) and for the evil agent
to choose fvt+1g
1
0 to maximize equation (8), subject to equations (9), (10), and (11) and a
known x0. The evil agent￿ s role in this problem is simply to help the leader devise a robust
policy. Following Hansen and Sargent (2007, chapter 2), the way forward is to apply the
Luenberger (1969) Lagrange multiplier theorem to replace this constraint problem, involving
equation (11), with an equivalent multiplier problem.
Recognizing that the state vector is given by xt, and that on the stable manifold the non-
predetermined variables, yt, must be a linear function of the state vector, xt, I conjecture that
5Note that although these assumptions about W, R, and the stabilizability of (A, B) are standard for
linear-quadratic control problems (see Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) for example), I do
not claim that any of them, speci￿cally the assumptions about R, are either necessary or su¢ cient for the
existence or uniqueness of equilibrium.
6Whether the followers actually use the distorted model to form expectations is not the point. The point
is that the leader fears that they do and designs its policy accordingly.
6the followers￿expectations of future non-predetermined variables are given by
Etyt+1 = HEtxt+1; (12)
where H is yet to be determined. Substituting equation (12) into equation (10) and combining
the resulting expression with equation (9) yields
A21xt + A22yt + B2ut = HEt [A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1 (vt+1 + "t+1)]: (13)
Now, given the leader￿ s fear that the followers use the distorted model to form expectations,
implying Etvt+1 6= 0, and the fact that the speci￿cation errors are measurable with respect to
period t information, implying Etvt+1 = vt+1, equation (13) leads to
xt+1 = Axt + But + Cvt+1 + C1"t+1; (14)
yt = Jxt + Kut + Lvt+1; (15)
where
J = [A22 ￿ HA12]
￿1 [HA11 ￿ A21]; (16)
K = [A22 ￿ HA12]
￿1 [HB1 ￿ B2]; (17)
L = [A22 ￿ HA12]
￿1 HC1; (18)
A = A11 + A12J; (19)
B = B1 + A12K; (20)
C = C1 + A12L: (21)
Equation (14) describes the behavior of the state variables, while equation (15) can be viewed
as the reaction function for the aggregate private sector. Notice that this reaction function
depends on vt+1 as well as ut, re￿ ecting the fact that the evil agent is also a Stackelberg leader











conformable with xt and yt, I use
equation (15) to eliminate the non-predetermined variables from the policy loss function. Fol-
lowing this substitution, recognizing that the value function takes the form V (xt) = x
0
tVxt+d,
writing the optimization problem recursively, and applying Luenberger￿ s Lagrange multiplier
theorem, the leader￿ s robust multiplier problem can be written as
x
0
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￿ 2 [￿;1), subject to equation (14) and a known x0. Because the objectives of the leader
and the evil agent are perfectly misaligned (they play a zero-sum game), the solution to this
minmax problem can be obtained by solving the simultaneous choice problem (Hansen and
Sargent, 2007, chapter 7). The ￿rst-order condition with respect to e ut for the simultaneous
choice problem gives rise to the decision rule















































H = J ￿ KFu ￿ LFv; (29)
respectively. The equations above provide the basis for calculating numerically the worst case
equilibrium, the vehicle through which the approximating equilibrium is obtained.
3.1.1 Worst-case equilibrium
In the worst-case equilibrium, re￿ ecting the leader￿ s worst-case fears, the approximating model
is misspeci￿ed according to the worst-case distortion and the followers use the distorted model
to form expectations. To obtain the worst-case equilibrium, I solve for the ￿x-point of
equations (16) through (20), (23) through (25), and (27) through (29); then the law of motion
8for the state variables, the non-predetermined variables, the leader￿ s control variables, and the
worst-case speci￿cation errors are given by
xt+1 = (A11 + A12H ￿ B1Fu ￿ C1Fv)xt + C1"t+1; (30)
yt = Hxt; (31)
ut = ￿Fuxt; (32)
vt+1 = ￿Fvxt; (33)
respectively.
3.1.2 Approximating equilibrium
In the approximating equilibrium, although the leader employs its robust decision rule, the
approximating model is not misspeci￿ed and the followers, who are not robust decisionmakers,
form expectations using the approximating model. The ￿rst step in obtaining the approximat-
ing equilibrium is to solve for the worst-case equilibrium, which supplies the leader￿ s robust
decision rule. Then, in a second step, I solve for the ￿x-point of
b J =
h
A22 ￿ b HA12
i￿1 h





A22 ￿ b HA12
i￿1 h
b HB1 ￿ B2
i
; (35)
b H = b J ￿ b KFu: (36)
The solution to this second ￿x-point problem recovers how the followers￿expectations are
formed. Then, in the approximating equilibrium, the state variables, the non-predetermined
variables, and the leader￿ s control variables are given by
xt+1 =
￿
A11 + A12 b H ￿ B1Fu
￿
xt + C1"t+1; (37)
yt = b Hxt; (38)
ut = ￿Fuxt; (39)
respectively.7





















for its rational expectations equilibrium. Where the rational expectations equilibrium is unique, the relationship
between yt and xt and the law of motion for the state variables obtained by solving this equation are given by
equations (37) and (38), respectively.
94 Robustness and uncertainty aversion
Using a big ￿X￿little ￿x￿notation, the law of motion for the state variables in the worst-case
equilibrium, equation (30), can be re-expressed as
xt+1 = (A11 + A12H ￿ B1Fu)xt + C1 (FvXt + "t+1); (40)
Xt+1 = MXt + C1"t+1;
where M ￿ A11 + A12H ￿ B1Fu ￿ C1Fv and xt = Xt in equilibrium. Thus, the worst-case
law of motion for the state variables is one in which the shock processes appear distorted, with
their conditional mean twisted, or slanted, relative to the approximating model.
Equation (40) suggests a connection between robust control and the maxmin expected
utility framework developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to describe behavior they refer
to as uncertainty aversion.8 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assume that beliefs about the
likelihood of future states are so vague that they are represented by a set of prior densities
rather than by a single prior density. The relationship between uncertainty aversion and
robust control is considered in Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006), who
document conditions under which the multiple models in the robust control framework is
behaviorally equivalent in the equilibrium to the multiple priors in the Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) framework.
The arguments in Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) suggest that
the solution to the robust control problem described in Section 3.1 can be obtained equivalently
by solving the problem in which the Stackelberg leader chooses futg
1
0 to minimize, and an
evil agent chooses point-wise the probabilities in the probability density function, p￿ (xt+1jxt),




















xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1"t+1; (42)
E￿
tyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (43)
Markov-perfection, and a known x0. In addition, the di⁄erence between the distorted con-
ditional probability density function, p￿ (xt+1jxt), and the rational expectations conditional
8See also Epstein and Wang (1994), who extend the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) analysis to intertemporal
models.
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p￿ (xt+1jxt)dxt+1 = 1;8 xt 2 <n2. Equation (44) is a (discounted) relative
entropy condition (Kullback and Leibler, 1951), in which the expectation of a (log-) likelihood
ratio is taken with respect to a distorted probability density.
The connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion suggests an alternative
interpretation of the worst-case equilibrium. In an important sense, the worst-case equilib-
rium can be viewed as a tool, or as a vehicle, for generating the worst-case prior density, with
decisions then made in view of this worst-case prior density. More generally, the connection
between robust control and uncertainty aversion facilitates analyzing robust control problems
in terms of the e⁄ect a fear of model uncertainty has on the beliefs held by the various agents
residing in the model. For this reason, it is the properties of the probability density func-
tions that underlie the rational expectations equilibrium, the worst-case equilibrium, and the
approximating equilibrium that I characterize and discuss when I analyze the new Keynesian
business cycle model.
5 Robust monetary policy
In this section I apply the tools developed above to the hybrid new Keynesian model summa-
rized in Section 2, analyzing and exploring the e⁄ect a central bank￿ s desire for robustness can
have on expectations, monetary policy, and the broader economy. I solve the central bank￿ s
robust decision problem, examine the nature of the speci￿cation errors that it fears, and docu-
ment how these speci￿cation errors distort the expectation operators that the central bank and
private agents use to form expectations. Following Section 3.1, I consider the case where the
central bank fears that private agents use the distorted model to form expectations. I report
the worst-case shock processes, I show how robustness distorts the expectation operators that
agents use, and I document the relationship between robustness and policy loss.
9In the approximating model, and hence in the worst-case equilibrium, the number of innovations, ns, will
generally be less than n. With the state vector, xt, consisting of shocks, st, and predetermined variables, pt,
p(xt+1jxt) is given by p(xt+1jxt) = jDjp(st+1jxt), where D is a Jacobian of transformation. The solution to
the robust control problem provides the Jacobians relevant for the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating
equilibrium.
11Before introducing robustness, it is useful to construct a benchmark by solving the nondis-
torted problem in which all expectations are formed rationally. For the parameterization
provided earlier, the central bank￿ s optimal discretionary policy can be described by the state-
contingent decision rule10
it = 5:180st + 6:133dt + 0:937￿t￿1 + 0:800ct￿1: (45)
The optimal policy is to raise the nominal interest rate in response to adverse supply shocks
and stimulatory demand shocks, thereby mitigating their contemporaneous impact on in￿ ation
and consumption, and to tighten policy in response to (past) higher in￿ ation and consumption,
thereby returning the economy to steady state more quickly. A notable feature of equation
(45) is that its feedback coe¢ cients are large, revealing aggressive policy responses even under
rational expectations.11
5.1 Robustness
To introduce robustness a value for ￿ must be provided. Following standard practice, I set
￿ to generate a particular detection error probability, here 0:1.12 As described earlier, the
central bank designs policy fearing that its approximating model is misspeci￿ed and fearing,
further, that private agents use the misspeci￿ed model to form expectations. For their part,
private agents are not concerned about model misspeci￿cation, and, in the approximating
equilibrium, their expectations are formed using the approximating model.
Applying the solution method developed in Section 3.1, the worst-case shock processes are
summarized by equations (46) and (47):
st+1 = 0:545st + 0:038dt + 0:007￿t￿1 + 0:004ct￿1 + "t+1; (46)
dt+1 = 0:041st + 0:544dt + 0:007￿t￿1 + 0:005ct￿1 + ￿t+1: (47)
10Equilibrium is given by the set fF;H;M;N;Vg, summarizing the decision rules for the central bank and
private agents, the law of motion for the state vector, and the matrix in the value function. However, I note
in passing that all of the policy rules reported in this paper are implementable. In other words, if the central
bank were to implement policy according to F and private agents were allowed to reform expectations, then
in the unique stable rational expectations equilibrium, private-agent decision rules are governed by H and the
law of motion for the state vector is governed by M and N.
11These feedback coe¢ cients, particularly on the shocks, depend importantly on the interest rate stabilization
parameter, ￿, and would be smaller were ￿ larger.
12Informally, a detection error probability is the probability that an econometrician observing equilibrium
outcomes would infer incorrectly whether the approximating equilibrium or the worst-case equilibrium generated
the data. Descriptions of how detection error probabilities can be calculated can be found in Hansen, Sargent,
and Wang (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2007, chapter 9), Dennis (2005), Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m
(2006a,b), and Cateau (2006). Only Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m (2006a,b) treat the case where the
speci￿cation errors distort both the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the shock processes.
12These worst-case shock processes can be interpreted two ways. One interpretation is
that they convey information about the location and behavior of speci￿cation errors that the
central bank should be concerned about. According to this interpretation, the central bank is
concerned that the demand and supply shocks may exhibit greater serial correlation than the
approximating model asserts, that the demand and supply shocks might be correlated, and
that the Phillips curve and the consumption Euler equation may omit terms involving lags of
consumption and in￿ ation. By revealing aspects of the model￿ s structure to which monetary
policy is particularly sensitive, the worst-case shock processes indicate areas of the model to
which the central bank should devote resources to ensure that the speci￿cation is appropriate.
An alternative interpretation is that the worst-case shock processes reveal how the central
bank￿ s expectation operator is twisted, or slanted, by its fear of misspeci￿cation. According to
this interpretation, the probability density function associated with the worst-case equilibrium
describes how the central bank forms expectations and how it fears that private agents form
expectations. Similarly, the probability density function associated with the approximating
equilibrium describes how households and ￿rms form expectations in the absence of misspec-
i￿cation, potentially di⁄ering from rational expectations through the in￿ uence of the central
bank￿ s robust policy. Note that the probability density function that the central bank employs
does not coincide with the economy￿ s data generating process in the approximating equilib-
rium, re￿ ecting the central bank￿ s enduring pessimism about its model. This interpretation
exploits the connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion, and focuses attention
on the probability density functions that underlie beliefs and expectation formation. It is the
properties of these beliefs, represented by probability density functions, that I characterize
and discuss in the remainder of this section.
13Fig. 1: Undistorted and distorted unconditional probability densities
Figure 1 displays the unconditional distributions of the supply shock, the demand shock,
in￿ ation, consumption, and the interest rate in the rational expectations equilibrium, the
worst-case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium, under the assumption that the
innovations, "t and ￿t, are joint n:i:i:d:[0;I] distributed.13 Relative to rational expectations,
the worst-case supply shock (panel A) and demand shock (panel B) each have greater uncon-
ditional variance. Although these distortions to the supply and demand shocks appear small,
they have important e⁄ects on the worst-case distributions of in￿ ation (panel C), consumption
(panel D), and the interest rate (panel E). Speci￿cally, the central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿ca-
tion causes it to assign greater probability to in￿ ation and consumption outcomes that would
13The assumption of normality has been added purely to enable densities to be plotted; it is unnecessary for
the solution method itself.
14seem extreme under rational expectations. Similarly, with the policy for the robust central
bank described by
it = 6:939st + 7:814dt + 1:208￿t￿1 + 0:967ct￿1; (48)
the interest rate￿ s worst-case distribution also exhibits a much greater unconditional variance
than the rational expectations distribution. Essentially, in terms of its unconditional expecta-
tions operator, the central bank obtains robustness by overweighting the probability it attaches
to extreme in￿ ation (in particular) and consumption outcomes, and this leads to an interest
rate distribution that also assigns greater probability to extreme interest rate outcomes.
The central bank￿ s desire to guard against extreme outcomes has important implications
for the approximating equilibrium. By designing policy to guard against extreme in￿ ation out-
comes, the robust policy has a strong damping e⁄ect on the distribution of in￿ ation (especially)
and consumption in the approximating equilibrium. As shown in panel C, in the approximat-
ing equilibrium, in￿ ation is distributed much more tightly about its unconditional mean than
when expectations are rational, illustrating how the central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿cation
leads it to ￿overstabilize￿in￿ ation. Similarly, the robust central bank also ￿overstabilizes￿
consumption (panel D), but at the cost of greater interest rate volatility (panel E).
Although the unconditional probability densities displayed in Figure 1 reveal the relation-
ship between the central bank￿ s pessimism and the probability it assigns to extreme outcomes,
because they are unconditional they do not reveal how model uncertainty twists, or slants,
the central bank￿ s conditional expectations operator. To this end, for a given initial state,14
Figure 2 presents the marginal probability density functions used to form one-quarter-ahead
forecasts.
14Speci￿cally, purely for illustrative purposes, in the initial period the supply shock, the demand shock, lagged
in￿ ation, and lagged consumption are all set to 1:0.
15Fig. 2: Distorted and undistorted one-quarter-ahead forecasts
Figure 2 focuses on one-quarter-ahead forecast densities because the recursive nature of the
robust optimization problem implies that it is these densities that are critical for the central
bank￿ s robust decision problem. Complementing Figure 1, panels A and B in Figure 2 show
that, although the worst-case probability densities for the supply and the demand shocks are
shifted to the right of those associated with the approximating equilibrium (which, of course,
coincide with rational expectations), the distortions are reasonably modest. At the same
time, these apparently small distortions to the shock distributions have a large impact on the
one-quarter-ahead forecast densities for in￿ ation (panel C), consumption (panel D) and the
interest rate (panel E). Revealing a more subtle story than Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that the
worst-case density for in￿ ation is slanted to the right, with the central bank fearing higher
16in￿ ation outcomes, and that the worst-case density for consumption is slanted to the left,
with the central bank fearing lower consumption outcomes. Although it may seem more intu-
itive for the central bank to fear higher consumption outcomes, which would be in￿ ationary,
the probability densities are not unconstrained. Through the structure of the approximat-
ing model, because the central bank pessimistically expects higher in￿ ation outcomes, it also
expects higher interest rate outcomes, which leads it to expect lower consumption outcomes.
Notice, however, that, unlike for consumption and the interest rate, where the distorted proba-
bility density function for future in￿ ation is right-slanted, its counterpart in the approximating
equilibrium is left-slanted.
Because the distribution of in￿ ation is especially interesting and relevant, particularly since
the central bank￿ s role in the economy is to provide in￿ ation with a nominal anchor, Figure 3
examines the probability density function for in￿ ation at di⁄erent forecast horizons.
Fig. 3: Conditional probability densities for in￿ ation
For the same initial state used for Figure 2, Figure 3 depicts the probability density func-
tions required to forecast in￿ ation one quarter ahead (panel A), one year ahead (panel B), two
17years ahead (panel C), and ￿ve years ahead (panel D) in the rational expectations equilibrium,
the worst-case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium. For the worst-case equilib-
rium, panel A illustrates the extent to which the central bank￿ s pessimism shifts rightward the
one-quarter-ahead forecast density relative to rational expectations. However, this rightward
shift, which raises the probability the central bank assigns to higher in￿ ation outcomes, is
evident in panels A to C. Equally evident in Figure 3 is the fact that the probability density
functions associated with the approximating equilibrium, relative to rational expectations, are
shifted to the left. The central bank￿ s robust policy, which attaches pessimistically large
probabilities to extreme in￿ ation outcomes, skews in￿ ation￿ s distribution downward in the
approximating equilibrium. As the forecast horizon lengthens, however, the distortions to in-
￿ ation￿ s conditional mean weaken and the conditional probability density function converges
to the unconditional probability density function. In fact, in￿ ation￿ s conditional probability
density function at the ￿ve-year horizon (Figure 3, panel D) essentially coincides with the
unconditional probability density function shown in Figure 1, panel C.
5.2 Robustness, detectability, and policy loss
Figure 4 traces out the relationship between the robustness parameter and the probability of
making a detection error, in panel A, and between the robustness parameter and the cost of
robustness, in panel B. I measure the cost of robustness according to










ap denotes policy loss in the approximating equilibrium and Ld
re denotes policy loss
in the rational expectations equilibrium. Panel A reveals that the probability of making a
detection error is monotonically increasing in the robustness parameter, ￿. Underlying this
result is the fact that, as ￿ increases, greater weight is placed on the approximating model as
being correct, the worst-case distortions are more tightly constrained, and the robust policy
converges to the rational expectations policy. As a consequence, in the limit as ￿ " 1, data
generated from the approximating equilibrium look increasingly like those generated from
the worst case equilibrium and the probability of making a detection error converges to 0:5
(Hansen and Sargent, 2007, chapter 9).
18Fig. 4: Detectability and the cost of robustness
Panel B depicts the relationship between the robustness parameter and the cost of ro-
bustness.15 What panel B reveals is that the central bank￿ s desire for robustness actually
causes policy loss to decline, not rise. In e⁄ect, even if speci￿cation errors are absent, the
central bank is better o⁄ using the robust policy than using the rational expectations policy.
Although this result may seem surprising at ￿rst, its genesis lies in the fact that monetary
policy is conducted with discretion rather than with commitment.16 Because private agents
are forward-looking, the time-consistent policy with rational expectations is not optimal ￿
it does not coincide with the optimal commitment policy ￿ and other policies exist whose
performance more closely approaches that of the optimal commitment policy.
As Dennis and S￿derstr￿m (2006) document, in rational expectations models discretionary
policies overstabilize consumption and understabilize in￿ ation, relative to commitment poli-
cies, giving rise to a stabilization bias. This bias can be unwound by stabilizing in￿ ation more
aggressively and stabilizing consumption less aggressively, however the absence of a commit-
ment mechanism makes this infeasible when expectations are rational. But model uncertainty
imparts a deviation from rational expectations, which causes the central bank to implement
15Appendix A describes how the policy loss function is evaluated.
16Dennis and Ravenna (2007) obtain a related result from a model in which a central bank conducts policy
while learning. The connection between the two results is that in each case policy is conducted with discretion
and the central bank is only boundedly rational.
19a policy that counteracts the likelihood of extreme in￿ ation outcomes, partly mitigating the
size of the stabilization bias. At the same time, as Figure 1 shows, the robust policy also
stabilizes consumption more aggressively, and, as a consequence, whether robustness raises or
lowers policy loss relative to the time-consistent rational expectations policy is likely to be
parameter and model dependent, an issue to which I now turn.
6 The cost of robustness
In the absence of misspeci￿cation, the optimal commitment policy is (weakly) superior to all
other policies, including robust policies. It follows immediately that a desire for robustness
cannot improve policy loss when the central bank can commit. However, as shown above,
when policy is conducted with discretion, stabilization bias provides an avenue whereby robust
policies can improve upon nonrobust policies. In this section, I investigate the factors that
govern this result and show that the ￿nding that the cost of robustness can be negative holds
for a wide range of parameter values.
I begin by presenting a simple model in which the central bank￿ s desire for robustness is
detrimental. Let in￿ ation obey the forward-looking new Keynesian Phillips curve
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿ct + st; (50)
where, as earlier, ct represents the consumption gap and st ￿ i:i:d[0;￿2
"] represents a cost













subject to equation (50) and s0 known. Notice that the decision problem described by
equations (50) and (51), which is equivalent to the problem in Woodford (2005), is a special
case of the decision problem that I analyzed in Section 5.
Taking the parameterization from Woodford (2005), I set ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:05, ￿ = 0:08,
and ￿" = 1:0. After introducing a desire for robustness, Figure 5 displays the relationship
between the robustness parameter, ￿, and the probability of making a detection error, in panel
A, and between the robustness parameter and the cost of robustness, in panel B.
20Fig. 5: Detectability and the cost of robustness (simple model)
Although the increase is small, no larger than 0:25 of a percentage point for the values of
￿ considered, Figure 5, panel B, shows that for this simple model a desire for robustness raises
policy loss. Since the simple model is a special case of the hybrid new Keynesian model, Figure
5 establishes that robustness is does not improve policy loss for all parameterizations of the
hybrid new Keynesian model. However, two questions immediately present themselves. First,
which parameters in the hybrid new Keynesian model govern whether the cost of robustness
is positive or negative? Second, is the negative cost of robustness exhibited in Figure 4 or the
positive cost of robustness exhibited in Figure 5 the more general result?
To address these questions, I begin by extending the simple Phillips curve (equation (50))
to allow for endogenous in￿ ation inertia and a serially correlated cost-push shock. With these
additions, the simple model becomes
￿t = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿t+1 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿ct + st; (52)
st = ￿st￿1 + ￿""t; (53)
with ￿ = ￿ = 0 as benchmark values. Now, I consider independent variation in the two
persistence parameters, ￿ and ￿, holding the detection-error probability constant at 0:25.17
17To prevent the detection-error probability from changing as I change the model parameters, I recalibrate ￿
for each parameterization. Note, however, that changes in ￿, while important for magnitudes, do not in￿ uence
21For this exercise, I vary (separately) ￿ between 0:00 and 0:95 and ￿ between 0:00 and 0:50,
keeping all other parameters at the benchmark values reported above. The results of this
exercise are displayed in Figure 6 alongside a measure of the discretionary stabilization bias,
which I construct according to










re denotes policy loss under commitment and Ld
re denotes policy loss under discretion,
both in the absence of robustness. Aside from special cases in which there is no time-
consistency problem, S is unambiguously negative. Because the policy loss associated with
the optimal commitment policy with rational expectations cannot be surpassed, equation (54)
provides a lower bound for the cost of robustness.
Fig. 6: Stabilization bias and the cost of robustness (simple model)
Panel A illustrates that adding persistence to the cost-push shock produces the result that
robustness improves policy loss when policy is conducted with discretion. Similarly, panel B
shows that adding endogenous persistence to the Phillips curve (raising ￿) also produces the
result that robustness improves policy loss. Together, panels A and B imply that persistence
whether the cost of robustness is positive or negative. The detection-error probability was set to 0:25 to ensure
that results could be obtained for all parameterizations of the simple model.
22in the Phillips curve, whether it be endogenous through ￿ or exogenous through ￿, is an
important factor for the result that robustness can improve policy loss.
Returning to the hybrid new Keynesian model, I now consider independent variations in ￿,
￿, ￿, and ￿, again holding the detection-error probability constant at 0:25. I vary (separately)
￿ between 0:00 and 0:95, ￿ between 0:00 and 0:95, ￿ between 0:00 and 0:50, and ￿ between
0:30 and 0:50, keeping the parameters that are not being changed at their benchmark values.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 7.
Fig. 7: Stabilization bias and the cost of robustness (hybrid NK model)
There are four important results to take away from Figure 7. First, the cost of robust-
ness is negative for almost all parameter combinations considered. Only in Panel A, for very
large values of ￿, is the cost of robustness positive. For example, if ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:95,
implying considerable in￿ ation persistence, then the cost of robustness is about 1:14 percent.
Second, the cost of robustness and the stabilization bias are strongly correlated, particularly
with respect to variation in ￿ and ￿. Speci￿cally, smaller values for the stabilization bias are
associated with smaller values for the cost of robustness. Third, although the cost of robust-
23ness is generally negative, the cost of robustness generally falls well shy of the stabilization
bias, which is to say that while robustness can lower policy loss it is certainly not a complete
substitute for a commitment mechanism. Fourth, although the cost of robustness varies with
all four of the parameters considered, consistent with Figure 6, it is most sensitive to variation
in ￿, the persistence parameter in the cost-push shock.
Together, the results in Figures 6 and 7 suggest strongly that persistence in in￿ ation,
particularly persistence introduced through the cost-push shock, is closely associated with the
￿nding that robustness can improve policy loss. Figures 6 and 7 also reveal that in￿ ation
persistence is a key factor governing the magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias,
consistent with Dennis and S￿derstr￿m (2007). Importantly, the result that the cost of
robustness is negative appears to hold for a wide range of parameter values in this model,
suggesting that it may hold more generally among new Keynesian models, particularly those
for which expectations are an important policy channel and the discretionary stabilization bias
is large.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a method for obtaining solutions to robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg
problems in which the leader fears distortions to private-agents expectations. I apply this
solution method to a stylized hybrid new Keynesian business cycle model to examine the e⁄ect
a concern for model misspeci￿cation can have on the behavior and policy decisions of a central
bank that conducts policy with discretion. Although I use robust control methods to gen-
erate the relevant equilibria, I exploit the connection between robust control and uncertainty
aversion to focus my analysis on the properties of the probability densities that households,
￿rms, and the central bank use to form expectations.
My analysis indicates that a concern for model uncertainty causes the central bank to
make decisions on the basis of a distorted conditional expectations operator that emphasizes
the possibility that in￿ ation (in particular) and consumption may be more persistent than
their approximating model acknowledges. Because the central bank fears that shocks to
in￿ ation and consumption will persist, it implements a policy that tends to stabilize in￿ ation
and consumption more tightly than the rational expectations policy. Through their e⁄ect
on in￿ ation, robust policies can improve on nonrobust policies by actually improving policy
performance. This result arises because the central bank￿ s concern for robustness moves
it to stabilize in￿ ation more tightly than would be credible were expectations rational, and
24this greater in￿ ation stabilization partly o⁄sets the higher variance of in￿ ation associated
with the discretionary stabilization bias. As a consequence, in this hybrid new Keynesian
model and with discretionary policymaking, some degree of robustness to model uncertainty
can be attained without sacri￿cing policy performance. Although the result that robustness
can improve policy performance in the absence of a commitment mechanism is parameter
dependent, it holds for a wide range of parameter values in the hybrid new Keynesian model
that I analyze. In fact, the connection between the cost of robustness and the magnitude of
the discretionary stabilization bias suggests that robustness is more likely to improve policy
performance in models and for parameterizations where the time inconsistency problem is
important and the stabilization bias is large.
Appendix A - Evaluating the loss function



















All of the equilibria considered in the paper can be expressed in the form
xt+1 = Mxt + N"t+1; (A2)
zt = Gxt; (A3)
ut = Fuxt; (A4)
vt+1 = Fvxt: (A5)
Given equations (A2) through (A5), the results in Appendices A1, A2, and A3 of Dennis













where P = c W+￿M
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(A6), it follows that
lim
￿"1







which is invariant to the economy￿ s initial state, x0.
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